This article contributes to the international corporate governance literature by examining factors that affect CEO compensation in China. The article models of CEO pay based on an understanding of the unique economic and structural reforms undertaken by the privatized State Owned Enterprises. The findings show that CEO compensation depends, in part, on the firm's operating profits and this indicates that incentive systems are being used to motivate top managers. Corporate governance factors have a significant impact on CEO compensation, but they do so in ways that differ from those in other countries. Our conclusions are robust across different formulations of the basic model and they have public policy implications for China and other transitional economies that are moving away from state ownership of business enterprises.
Introduction
The literature documents well China' s economic reforms and the privatization of its industrial enterprises (e.g., Li et al., 2004) . Paradoxically, strong economic growth, fueled by pent-up domestic demand and burgeoning exports, is accompanied by poor corporate performance using accounting and stock market measures of success (Chen et al., 1998) . Three reasons put forward for firms' poor performances are the government's interference with commercial decisions, poor corporate governance, and the lack of incentives for top managers (Chen et al., 2006) .
This article sheds light on the incentive issue by examining the compensation of CEOs in
China's listed firms. In particular, we investigate whether a CEO's pay depends on the firm's performance and whether ownership and boardroom characteristics have an impact on both pay and the pay-for-performance relation. The article identifies the main influences on CEO pay and critique the apparent pay processes used by firms. Now is an opportune time to examine CEO compensation in China as the listed company experiment has been in operation for more than 10 years. We need to learn lessons from the past and make recommendations that will assist future policy making.
The findings show a positive pay-performance relation in China when performance is measured as return on assets. Thus , firms reward their CEOs when their firms have good operating profits. In contrast, stock returns do not relate with CEO compensation. The article provides evidence that state ownership acts to reduce compensation levels and the presence of a foreign shareholder acts to increase pay levels. Foreign-invested firms have higher pay-for-performance sensitivities. Internal governance does have an impact on CEO compensation. Firms with large boards of directors pay their CEOs less, firms with a lot of non-executive directors are more likely to use performance-based pay, and a firm that has a joint CEO -chairman position is less likely to use performance-based pay.
The article has the following structure. Section 2 provides a brief description of China's privatization program and discusses how top executive rewa rd systems have changed. Section 3 reviews the theoretical foundations of CEO pay and develops hypotheses about the determinants of executive compensation in China. Section 4 describes the research method. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results and Part 7 concludes the paper and discusses the policy implications and the limitations of the study.
Institutional background
The reorganization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) is a key ingredient in the economic modernization of China. Here, the operational activities of many, but not all, SOEs are reorganized into companies with share capital and profit making objectives. Many of the corporatized enterprises have subsequently sold shares to the public (a process called privatization) and these shares have been listed on the stock market. However in many cases the government has retained a significant ownership stake 1 , which often amounts to effective control. In 2001 the government introduced a plan to sell off the state's remaining shares in listed firms (the so-called second stage of privatization) but this was shelved after strong protests from private investors. The private investors were conc erned that the sale of state shares would flood the market and stock prices would plummet. In 2005 the government resurrected the plan to sell state shares in listed firms and made the plan more palatable for private investors by reducing the number of new IPOs (thereby reducing the supply of other new shares) and requiring firms to compensate private investors (the compensation will be 1 When the government keeps an ownership interest a more apt description is partial privatization. In common with other studies we use the more simple term privatization.
mainly by way of issuing bonus shares). The reorganization of listed firms has been modeled on U.S.
corporations in a bold attempt to instill western-style discipline and incentives (Tam, 2000) . For example, managers have more discretion in making business decisions and they are held accountable to stockholders rather than to the state and the political hierarchy. Evidence suggests that this objective has met with only partial success (Chen et al., 2006) .
After the economic reforms began, managers were given more autonomy and incentive pay systems began to appear (Groves et al., 1994) . In the early 1980s the government introduced a contract responsibility system (CRS) for SOEs. Under the CRS, managers were rewarded if the SOE's performance exceeded expectations (as laid out in the contract). Firms that earned higher profits than expected were able to retain the surplus and managers were paid bonuses based on that surplus. Although there were problems with the CRS (Chen et al., 1998) it did sow the seed for further developments in reward systems.
In the early-and mid-1990s the top manager of the SOE (or unit of a SOE) became the CEO of the company once it listed and their pay was a function of the civil service grade that they occupied. Incentive and reward systems were considered to be quite weak during this time (see Huang and Zhang, 1995; Qian, 1995; Yang, 1998; and Zheng, 1998) . As the reform process evolved, pay levels departed from civil service rates and became more varied across firms. An embryonic labor market has developed and CEO turnover is quite high . CEOs are increasingly being appointed from outside the firm. Managerial compensation is decided by the board of directors and does not need the approval of stockholders. During the time of our study, compensation committees did not exist.
Share ownership by CEOs and executive directors is very low (Xu, 2004) and their main source of income is from cash compensation. In 1999, the government considered allowing listed firms to offer stock options to the CEO and other senior managers. However, after much debate, the government decided against allowing this practice. One reason for not allowing executive stock options is that there is no source from which to give shares to the executives who wish to exercise their options; treasury stock (share repurchases) is not allowed and any new issue of shares (to give to the executives) requires regulatory approval, which is difficult to get. The lack of executive stock options is one reason why share ownership by CEOs and top managers is so low. The absence of executive stock options removes one method of aligning the interests of managers and the shareholders (we note, however, that the use of stock options in the U.S. has been subject to criticism (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) Code lays out detailed standards to which firms should adhere and it is similar in many respects to codes of governance in other markets (e.g., Hong Kong, the U.K.). Despite the good intentions of the Code, there are conflicting views on how well they have been accepted or implemented by firms and there are also conflicting views on whether they have had a good effect on firms' performances (Bai et al., 2003; Lin, 2000) . .
Theoretical foundation and hypotheses
Because relatively little is known about how top management compensation is actually set in Chinese listed firms our hypotheses are exploratory in nature. We draw upon our knowledge of China's reforms to guide us in formulating the hypotheses and we buttress this with information gained from interviewing company officers. China's corporate reforms are aimed at emulating practices in North America and Europe and so we draw on the international literature on executive pay in deriving the hypotheses. We focus on whether performance drives CEO pay (pay contingent on performance). Additional research questions are whether the type of share owner and the boardroom characteristics have an impact on pay and the pay-for-performance relation.
Performance
Senior managers in China were brought up in a socialist environment where economic efficiency and corporate profitability were secondary to fulfilling government objectives. With the transformation to a market economy it is imperative that these senior managers refocus their efforts on maximizing profits and shareholder value (Cragg and Dyck, 2000; Wolfram, 1998) . In order to induce CEOs to maximize shareholder wealth, firms need to introduce efficient incentive systems.
One such system is to tie remuneration to firm performance. This pay-for-performance link is a basic tenet of principal-agent theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . We hypothesize that the CEO's compensation depends on the firm's financial performance. The hypothesis is predicated on the following stylized facts. First, in the early part of the reforms there is documented evidence that top management pay in SOEs depends on performance (Groves et al., 1994; Mengistae and Xu, 2004 Cadbury (1992) , Hampel (1998 ), Greenbury (1995 , and others, urge firms to adopt a set of recommended practices and decision-making mechanisms. Good corporate governance includes active oversight by investors and the appointment of independent directors.
China's listed firms have unique ownership structures. In almost all firms there is a dominant shareholder who has significant influence over the way a firm is run and on the appointment and pay of the CEO. Xu (2004) shows that, on average, the largest shareholder in a firm owns 43% of the issued shares, while the second largest owns less than 5%; thus the largest shareholder usually has effective control of the firm. Furthermore, the state is the largest shareholder in many listed firms. For these firms, the CEO is often a state bureaucrat who is seconded to the firm (and who returns to the state ministry from whence they came when their term as CEO ends). As state bureaucrats receive relatively low salaries we believe that their pay as a CEO at a listed firm will be lower than the CEOs at firms where the controlling shareholder is not the state. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: CEO pay is lower when the firm is controlled by the state.
The state has been characterized as being a poor monitor of a firm's financial performance because they are too detached from the firm (Shleifer, 1998) . Moreover, the state may pressure the firm to pursue objectives other than profit maximization (e.g., to increase employment). These reasons suggest that state controlled firms are less likely to adopt performance-related pay schemes for the CEO. To test this relation we formulate the following hypothesis:
The positive relation between CEO pay and performance will be weaker in firms whose controlling shareholder is the state.
In China, the major shareholder is considered to be an insider and this shareholder has a crucial say in the appointment and remuneration of the CEO. This power can lead to abuses unless there is effective monitoring by outside investors. In capitalist economies, outside investors monitor management actions and can take steps to discipline or remove poorly performing executives. The costs of this monitoring role are quite high, however, and so in practice it is only large investors who can afford to actively intervene in a company's affairs (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Khan et al., 2005) . In contrast, when ownership is dispersed there is greater managerial power and CEOs can award themselves higher pay (Firth et al., 1999) . While China has no direct equivalent to the type of institutional investors seen in the U.S., there are large outside shareholders who are independent of the largest s hareholder. We hypothesize that these large outside investors will help constrain abuses that lead to 'excessive' CEO pay and they will encourage the use of performance-related compensation schemes. This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and the voting strength of large outside investors.
Hypothesis 3A:
The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance is stronger when large outside shareholders have higher ownership.
Some Chinese l isted firms are allowed to issue shares to international investors (these are called B-shares). In order to induce foreign investors to buy its shares, a firm is more likely to adopt international standards of governance and business practices. Foreign investors are likely to pressure firms to hire better qualified CEOs who have international experience. These managers are able to negotiate higher pay. We also believe that foreign investors will exert pressure on firms to use performance-related pay schemes to reward their CEOs. The two foreign investor hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and the presence of foreign ownership.
Hypothesis 4A: The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance will be stronger if the firm has foreign shareholders.
The board of directors is responsible for the internal governance of firms and it has oversight over the CEO's compensation. As a consequence of this, the characteristics of the board have been used to help exp lain top executive pay in North America, Europe, and many developed countries. For example, a more independent board may act to restrain 'excessive' CEO pay (Boyd, 1994; Lambert et al., 1993) and to insist on linking the pay to the firm's performance. Howe ver, some studies find that independent directors inflate a CEO's pay (Firth et al., 1999) . This might arise because the independent non-executive directors use the high pay for the CEO as a comparison benchmark when they negotiate or renegotiate their remuneration at the firms or organizations where they work fulltime. Thus they have an incentive for average executive pay to rise. Large boards of directors are likely to have a wider level of expertise although they can become so unwieldy that they become ineffective in monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993) . Core et al. (1999) find that large boards are associated with excessive CEO pay. Some firms have the same person occupying the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. In this circumstance, the CEO/chairman has a lot of power and this has the potential to lead to excessive pay that bears no resemblance to performance. The empirical evidence on CEO/chairman duality has reached mixed conclusions. For example, Core et al. (1999) find that duality leads to higher pay in the U.S., while Conyon (1997) Hypothesis 5: There is no relation between CEO pay and board independence (board size, duality).
Hypothesis 6: The positive relation between pay and performance is not affected by board independence (board size, duality).
Research method

Sample
Our sample consists of non-financial companies that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges throughout the years 1998 to 2000. The start date is the first year that listed companies were required to disclose top management compensation. We exclude financial companies because their financial characteristics are far different from other firms. Moreover, financial firms are subject to more regulation and this may have an impact on CEO pay. We use the company annual reports as our source of information for executive compensation, ownership, non-executive directors, board size, and CEO/chairman characteristics. As the independent variables are lagged values from year t-1 we need data from 1997. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from the CSMAR Database. Missing annual reports and missing observatio ns on the CSMAR Database reduce the sample size. The final sample consists of 549 companies and 1647 firm-year observations.
Variables
The dependent variable is CEO PAY. Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and we use this as a proxy for the pay of the CEO. The CEO's total cash compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and commissions (unfortunately the pay is not broken down into these components). Bonus pay is likely to be a function of firm performance, but the formula used and the actual bonus that is paid is not disclosed (bonus pay is aggregated into total pay). We use the natural log of the CEO PAY in the regression models.
We use two measures of performance, namely, return on assets (ROA), which is the operating profit divided by assets, and stock return (RETURN). The first measure, ROA, is more dependent on and more under the control of managers, and maximizing profitability is the goal or target that the CEO strives for. We use operating profit (also known as "core earnings") rather than net income as the net income includes gains and losses from asset sales and inter-company transfers (also known as "non-core earnings") ; these gains and losses from asset sales and transfers are often outside the control of the CEO and so we do not include them in our measure of performance (however, replications of our tests using net income gives similar results and conclusions to those based on operating profit). Problems with the return on assets measure include the encouragement of a short term or myopic outlook at the expense of longer-term profitability, and the manipulation of accounting numbers by managers (although operating profit is harder to manipulate than net income).
The second measure, stock return, represents the benefits to shareholders. A characteristic of stock returns is that they are harder for managers to manipulate than earnings and they ostensibly measure the longer-term profitability of the firm. One drawback to the use of stock returns is that share prices are subject to the vagaries of the stock market and to changes in the macro-environment including interest rates, inflation, and commodity prices; these factors are outside the control of the managers.
In our regressions we use lagged performance from year t-1 to explain cash compensation. Thus, CEO PAY is determined by performance in the prior year. As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses with contemporaneous performance measures; the results are broadly consistent with those derived from lagged measures of performance.
If the state is the major shareholder in a firm then the variable STATE is coded one (1) The ownership and boardroom characteristics are measured at the beginning of the year and they appear as main effects in the regression models. They are also interacted with the two performance measures (ROA and RETURN) ; the interaction terms are used to test whether ownership and board characteristics have an effect on the pay-performance relation. The interaction terms using We use two categories of control variables in our models. These categories are (a) operating characteristics, and (b) other control factors. The operating characteristics are firm size (SIZE), risk (RISK), growth opportunities (GROWTH), and debt (DEBT). Extensive research in many countries has shown that firm size is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon, 1997; Firth et al., 1996 Firth et al., , 1999 . Complexity of the job, the skills required, the number of hierarchical structures, and the ability to pay, all point toward large firms paying their CEOs more. We take the natural log of the book asset value as our proxy for firm size and we measure it as at the beginning of the year.
Lippert and Moore (1994) and Lippert and Porter (1997) find CEO compensation is higher at firms with greater stock return volatility (risk). High business risk is passed down to the CEO (e.g., job tenure) and so higher compensation is demanded (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999 ). In our model, RISK is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of the company measured over the previous 12 months. Managers are often charged with devel oping growth opportunities for firms
and in which case they should be rewarded for their success in this endeavor. We follow previous researchers (e.g., Lippert and Moore, 1994) and use lagged market value to book asset value as a proxy for growth opportunities (GROWTH). A firm with external debt is subject to monitoring by the debt holders and so CEOs face restrictions on their managerial discretion. John and John (1993) argue that pay policy can be used as a pre-commitment device to reduce the agency cost of debt. We therefore include DEBT as a control variable. DEBT is defined as the book value of the long-term debt to the book value of the shareholders' equity. RISK, GROWTH, and DEBT are measured at the beginning of the year.
Other control factors are included in the model to account for regional and industry differences (see Table 1 for the definitions of AREA and IND). AREAs 1 and 2 are more prosperous and have a higher cost of living than AREAs 3 and 4. Therefore we expect CEO compensation to be higher in AREAs 1 and 2. Industry is based on stock exchange classifications. Finally, YEAR is added to control for time. Table 1 lists the variables and definitions used in our study.
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Model
We use regression analysis to test the relation between pay, performance, ownership, and boardroom variables. The general model is:
CEO PAY = a + ß 1 PERFORMANCE + ß 2 OWNERSHIP +ß 3 BOARDROOM +ß 4 OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS +ß 5 CONTROL FACTORS + e (1) Although low by standards in the West, CEO compensation in China is approximately twelve times higher than the average worker. This differential between the CEO's pay and the average worker is much higher than in some other developing countries (Jones and Mygind, 2004) . The state is the largest single shareholder in about 56% of the observations (STATE = 0.56).
Empirical results
Sample characteristics
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The variable OUTSIDE has yearly medians of 9% (2000), 9% (1999) , and 8% (1998). The combined shareholdings of the second through tenth largest shareholder are generally much lower than the ownership by the largest shareholder and so the largest shareholder has control over, or substantial influence on, the listed firm. The proportion of the non-executive directors is about 50%
and this is comparable to the ratio of non-executive directors in the U.S. (Core et al., 1999) , Britain (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997) , and Hong Kong (Firth et al., 1999) . The mean board size is nine . As a comparison, the average board size for U.S. companies is 13 (Core et al., 1999) and 9 for U.K.
companies (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997) . Board size is therefore comparable to those observed in developed countries. In 1998, approximately 32% of the board chairmen also held the position of chief executive officer, but this ratio reduces to 22% in 1999 and 16% in 2000. The reduction in the percentage of the dual roles is the result of an administrative instruction made in 1998 that requested firms to separa te the roles of chairman and CEO. As a comparison, Conyon (1997) reports 23% of firms have dual CEO and chairman roles in his U.K. sample.
Regression results
The regression results are shown in Table 3 . In panel A, we use return on assets (ROA) as our prime performance measure, while in panel B we use stock return (RETURN). Model 1 shows the results for performance (ROA, RETURN ), model 2 adds ownership and board variables, model 3 adds performance interaction terms, model 4 adds control variables (but no interactions), and model 5 is the full model. The interaction terms are used to investigate whether specific ownership structures are associated with performance-related pay for the CEO. Correlations among the independent variables are low to moderate (for example, all correlations are less than an absolute value of 0.40). We also compute variance inflation factors for each variable and they are all below 3.5. These diagnostic statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our models. Table 3 Here
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We find that lagged ROA is significantly and positively associated with CEO PAY (panel A).
Note We also test our models where performance, size, growth, and debt are measured contemporaneously. The results are similar to those shown in Table 3 . In further sensitivity tests we use the percentage of shares owned by the state (%STATE) and the percentage owned by foreigners (%FOREIGN) in place of STATE and FOREIGN. The results from using %STATE and %FOREIGN in the regression models are qualitatively the same as the results from using the indicator variables STATE and FOREIGN. We also include FOREIGN and %FOREIGN in the same regression;
FOREIGN is significant and %FOREIGN is marginally significant. From these results we conclude that the mere presence of foreign investors increases the CEO pay and the percentage of shares owned by foreigners is of lesser importance. Given the rapidly changing nature of the Chinese economy and the frequent changes in regulations, we also run regressions on yearly data (i.e., separate regressions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 data). The results are similar to those shown in Table 3 .
Thus inter-temporal differences are slight.
To confirm our results on the pay-for-performance relation we examine the sensitivity of compensation to performance by regressing change in pay on change in operating profitability and stock return. We also estimate the elasticity of compensation with respect to performance by regressing the change in the log of CEO pay on the change in the log of performance. We include controls for STATE, OUTSIDE , FOREIGN, NONEXEC, BOARD, and DUAL. The results show significant pay sensitivities and elasticities for ROA t-1 but not for RETURN t-1 . When we include interaction terms in the models we find that the pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities are positive and significant for ROAt-1*FOREIGN and ROA t-1*NONEXEC. ROAt-1*DUAL has negative coefficients.
Discussion
We find that a CEO's compensation depends, in part, on the firm's performance. In particular, compensation is greater when return on assets is high. However, there is no association between stock return and a CEO's pay. The emphasis on operating profits to help determine a CEO's pay, rather than stock returns, contrasts w ith U.S. practice. Stock returns tend to move together in China (Morck et al., 2000) reflecting market-wide factors; firm specific factors have less influence on stock prices.
We therefore believe firms are reluctant to reward CEOs on the basis of stock returns and, instead, use accounting-based measures of performance. Foreign-invested companies are more likely to base the CEO's pay on the firm's operating profitability.
The type of owner seems to matter in explaining CEO pay; state controlled firms pay less and foreign-invested firms pay more. CEOs of firms controlled by the state are often state bureaucrats and they are paid in line with the senior civil servant salary levels. The trend is for the state to reduce its ownership and for there to be more fo reign investment in listed firms as China opens up its economy.
Moreover, the labor market is becoming more liquid with a greatly expanded pool of managerial talent. All this suggests that CEO pay will rise in the coming years and fewer bureaucrats will occupy the CEO position.
Large board size appears to constrain CEO pay although the exact reasons for this are unknown. Boards with a large proportion of non-executive directors are more likely to implement performance-related pay schemes for their CEOs (performance based on operating profits). Thus, the independent or non-executive directors help to align the interests of shareholders and the CEO via the compensation of the CEO. When one person is both the CEO and the chairman he or she has a lot of power (and they can become entrenched). Our results show that firms with a dual CEO/chairman place far less weight on performance-related pay. The performance (ROA) and boardroom interactions show that the internal governance structure does play a role in incentivizing top management by making CEO pay contingent on the firm's performance.
Conclusion
A central theme of the debate on top management pay is whether compensation is related to firm performance. This question is very important in China because merit based pay was an alien concept under the central planning system that existed prior to the economic reforms. We find a positive relation between CEO compensation and performance based on return on assets (ROA).
Ownership structure has a significant influence on pay. In particular, firms with substantial government ownership and firms with large outside investors have lower CEO compensation. The presence of a foreign shareholder is associated with higher CEO pay. There is statistically significant evidence consistent with foreign shareholders pressuring firms to adopt performance-related pay schemes that are based on profitability. Firms with large boards pay their CEOs less and this result contrasts with the predictions of Jensen (1993) . The results are consistent with non-executive directors, our proxy for independent directors, encouraging the use of performance-related pay while CEO/chairman duality reduces the use of performance-related compensation.
One of the problems in carrying out empirical research on China's listed firms is the paucity of data especially when compared to North America and some Western nations. For example, unlike some other countries, total compensation is not broken down into salary, benefits, and bonuses. We do not know for sure if bonuses are paid but we can infer them because of the statistical link between operating profitability and compensation (and because of evidence from studies that use survey data on SOEs). We cannot identify independent directors in our sample (the data do not become available until 2003) and so we use non-executive directors as a proxy. Another limitation of our study is that the compensation of the CEO is not directly given. Therefore we assume the highest paid executive is the CEO. These and other limitations can be overcome in the future as and when more detailed disclosure is made.
While China's economic growth is envied by many, the profitability of individual listed firms has been lamentable. One cause of poor performance is the lack of incentives for top management.
We therefore believe it is crucial that CEOs be rewarded on the basis of their firms' performances.
One policy implication of our study is that firms should increase the number of truly independent non-executive directors on the board. We believe this will result in a greater use of performancebased pay for the CEO. Another implication of the study is that firms should be discouraged from having a joint CEO/chairman as this reduces the use of performance-based pay. Unlike other countries, stock options are not granted in China. The lack of executive stock options is a missing ingredient in the design of incentive systems that align the interests of managers and investors 3 . This is something that the Chinese government and its economic planners need to redress. The lack of stock options as a reward mechanism is exacerbated by the very low share ownership by CEOs and top executives. To reap the full rewards of privatization, the state needs to step back from using political considerations in appointing and controlling CEOs. A thoroughly independent appointments committee may help in this regard. Allied to this, however, there must be a concerted effort to improve the incentives and rewards for CEOs. Without adequate top management rewards, the efforts exerted in economic restructuring may be in vain.
3 Note, however, that executive stock options do not always lead to improved future performance (McGuire and Matta, 2003) .
Governments and other stakeholders should encourage firms, or even mandate them, to provide more extensive financial disclosures on top executive pay. The increasing autonomy given to managers needs to be balanced with more accountability and transparency. Good corporate governance mechanisms can do a lot to enhance the effectiveness of the CEO. Improving financial transparency help s investors in their monitoring and oversight roles.
China's listed firms are evolving fast as are its business practices and corporate governa nce.
These rapid changes provide a lot of scope for future research. Increasing disclosure by firms (e.g., the breakdown of pay into base salary and bonuses) and by the state reducing constraints on the forms of CEO pay (e.g., stock options) will facilitate future research in CEO pay. China's brand of economic reforms is exportable to other developing countries. However before this happens, more scientific study is necessary so that we have a better understanding of how the reforms work and how they impact incentives and rewards. Table 3 shows the coefficients from a regression using the following model: CEO PAY = α + β 1 PERFORMANCE t-1 + β 2 OWNERSHIP + β 3 BOARD STRUCTURE + β 4 OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS + β 5 CONTROL FACTORS +ε. CEO PAY = the natural log of cash payment; ROA = operating profit in year t-1 divided by total assets; RETURN = annual stock return in year t-1; STATE = a dummy variable coded one (1) if the state is the largest shareholder in the company; OUTSIDE = percentage of shares owned by the second large st to tenth largest shareholder; FOREIGN = a dummy variable equal to one (1) if the company has issued foreign shares; NONEXEC = the proportion of unpaid directors to total number of directors on the board; BOARD = the number of directors on the board; DUAL = a dummy variable if the chairman also serves as CEO; SIZE = the natural log of total assets; RISK = the standard deviation of the monthly stock return; GROWTH = the ratio of market value to book value of assets; DEBT = b ook value of the long term debt to book value of the shareholders' equity. √ indicates area, industry, and year controls (AREA, IND, YEAR) have been included. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, (two tailed test
